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THE EQUAL PAY ACT AS APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION
UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: CAN STATE EMPLOYERS BE SUED?
Thane Somerville
Abstract: Congress may constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity only through
legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to be inappropriate Section 5 legislation. Kimel was the
first time the Court held an anti-discrimination statute enacted to protect civil rights
inapplicable to the states. Based on the Kimel decision, other civil rights statutes, such as the
Equal Pay Act (EPA), may face similar challenges. This Comment argues that the EPA is
appropriate Section 5 legislation. Unlike recent statutes struck down as inappropriate Section
5 legislation, the EPA does not grant plaintiffs more substantive rights than the Constitution.
The EPA is a narrowly tailored statute enacted to prevent gender-based wage discrimination
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress reviewed substantial evidence of gender-
based wage discrimination by state employers before it enacted the EPA. Based on this
evidence, Congress enacted the EPA to provide a remedy for such prevalent discrimination.
Courts should find that the EPA is appropriate legislation under Section 5 to enforce the
substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
In 1960, three years before Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act
(EPA),' women annually earned, on average, sixty-one percent as much
as men.2 Factors that partially explained the wage differential included
lack of employment opportunities for women and the historical tendency
to push women into lower-paying administrative and secretarial
positions.' However, those factors do not explain why men and women
employed in the same occupations were paid differently.4 After eighteen
months of hearings,5 including testimony from working women and
leaders of American industry, Congress enacted the EPA to remedy the
serious problem of gender-based wage discrimination in the private
sector.6
1. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1994)).
2. MICHAEL J. ZIMMERETAL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 973 (4th ed. 1997).
3. Id. at 973-74.
4. Thomas E. Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay Act 1963-1970,
39 U. CN. L. REv. 615, 617 (1970).
5. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
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Gender-based wage discrimination was not, however, limited to the
private sector. In the early 1970s Congress heard extensive testimony
that public employers engaged in rampant gender discrimination.7
Congress reacted to this information by enacting Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,' which prohibited gender discrim-
ination in all education programs receiving federal funds.9 Congress also
extended the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19640 to
state employees." Finally, based on the substantial evidence of public-
sector wage discrimination gathered by Congress over the preceding four
years, Congress amended the EPA in 197412 to apply to state
employers. 1
3
Since the enactment of the EPA, the wage gap has closed, but at an
extremely slow pace. In 1998, the median annual earnings for full time
working women were seventy-three percent as much as men's earnings.
14
The availability of the EPA as a remedy for female employees who do
not receive equal pay because of gender discrimination plays an
important part in eliminating the wage gap. However, female plaintiffs
employed in the public sector attempting to vindicate their right to equal
pay have recently faced a new hurdle to overcome: the Eleventh
Amendment defense of state sovereign immunity.'5
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,6 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress could not abrogate sovereign immunity except through
legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
7. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
8. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,86 Stat. 373,373 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994)).
9. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 373, 373.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1994).
11. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §2000e).
12 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (1994)).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (x) (1994) (redefining employer to include "public agencies" which
include "the government of a State or a political subdivision thereof'); see also id. § 203(e)(2)(c)
(redefining employee as "any individual employed by a State, political subdivision of a State or an
interstate governmental agency').
14. U.S. CENsus BuREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NO. P60-206, MONEY INCOME IN THE UNITED
STATES x (1998).
15. Sovereign immunity precludes suits against the government without its consent. See
THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 341 (4th ed. 1996).
16. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Vol. 76:279, 2001
Section 5 and the Equal Pay Act
to the U.S. Constitution."7 One year after Seminole Tribe, the Court, in
City of Boerne v. Flores,'g limited the scope of appropriate Section 5
legislation to that designed to remedy or prevent unconstitutional
conduct.19 Legislation is not appropriate under Section 5 if it grants
plaintiffs more substantive rights than the Constitution because such
legislation changes the substance of constitutional protection."
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,2 the U.S. Supreme Court
eliminated any assumption that legislation protecting civil rights would
automatically be deemed appropriate legislation to enforce the
Fourteenth AmendmentY' In Kimel, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity through the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967' (ADEA).24 This was the
first time that the Court held an anti-discrimination statute enacted to
protect civil rights inapplicable to the states. Since Kimel, three courts of
appeals have evaluated whether the EPA is appropriate Section 5
legislation.' These courts concluded that states remain subject to suit
under the EPA.
26
This Comment argues that lower courts have correctly upheld the EPA
as appropriate Section 5 legislation. Part I outlines the substantive
elements of the EPA. Part I introduces the constitutional doctrine of
state sovereign immunity. Part I discusses the "congruence and
proportionality" test used by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine what
constitutes appropriate Section 5 legislation. Part IV examines to what
extent gender discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Part V
17. Seeil at59.
18. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
19. See id. at 519-20.
20. See id
21. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
22. Id. at 91-92.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (1994).
24. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
25. See Vamerv. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000),; Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ.,
224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000); Hundertmark v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.
2000);.
26. After Kimel, two district courts also upheld the EPA as appropriate Section 5 legislation. See
Stewart v. State Univ. of N.Y. Maritime Coll., No. 99 Civ. 5153 DLC, 2000 WL 1218379 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25,2000); Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 107 F. Supp. 2d 158, 165 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
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argues that the EPA is appropriate Section 5 legislation and that EPA
plaintiffs should remain able to sue state employers.
I. LEGISLATING AGAINST GENDER-BASED WAGE
DISCRIMINATION: THE EQUAL PAY ACT
The EPA prohibits gender-based wage discrimination occurring when
a man and a woman are found to do equal work for unequal pay." Prior
to enacting the EPA, Congress heard substantial testimony regarding
gender discrimination occurring in private-sector employment. 28
Congress deemed legislation necessary to end gender-based wage
discrimination, but industry leaders were concerned that Congress would
disallow legitimate pay structures, such as those based on job value,
seniority, or merit.29 Due to these concerns, Congress crafted a statute
that would hold liable only those employers who engaged in gender-
based wage discrimination. 0
Congress drafted the EPA narrowly, making it applicable only to
gender-based wage discrimination between men and women who do
equal work. The EPA's narrow scope becomes apparent after examining
the prima faie requirements a plaintiff must satisfy. A plaintiff has the
burden of proving that (1) two workers of the opposite sex, (2) in the
same establishment, (3) are receiving unequal pay, (4) for equal work.3'
The statute specifically states that equal work entails "equal skill, effort,
and responsibility.. . performed under similar working conditions., 32
Addressing employers' concerns, Congress gave employers four
affirmative defenses that they could assert to show that any alleged wage
discrimination was not based on gender.33 An employer can avoid
liability under the EPA if it proves that unequal pay results from (1) a
seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system measuring earnings
based on production, or (4) "any other factor other than sex. 3 4 The
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
28. See generally Equal Pay For Equal Work: Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of
the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 87th Cong. (1962).
29. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198-201 (1974).
30. See id. at 201.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir.
1999) (describing plaintiff's prima facie burden under EPA).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
33. Id.; see also Brennan, 417 U.S. at 196-201.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
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employer carries the burden of proving one of the affirmative defenses to
avoid liability." Although a clear discriminatory intent may be revealed
in many EPA cases due to the defendant's inability to prove legitimate
reasons for the unequal pay, the plaintiff is not required to prove
discriminatory intent to prevail.36
II. THE RESURGENCE OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution" provides states
with immunity from claims brought under federal law in both federal and
state court.38 Congress has a limited power to abrogate this immunity
through federal legislation.39 That power resides in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
to be the only means available to Congress to abrogate sovereign
immunity.40
A. Judicial Construction of Sovereign Immunity
The literal text of the Eleventh Amendment provides states immunity
only from suits brought under the citizen-state diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts.4' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not confined
state sovereign immunity to the textual boundaries of the Amendment.42
Instead, the Court has held that established constitutional principles of
sovereignty and federalism bar a citizen from suing the citizen's own
state in federal court even when the suit is based on federal question
35. Brennan, 417 U.S. at 196.
36. ZIMM ET AL., supra note 2, at 1008.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
38. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745 (1999).
39. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
40. See Coil. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670(1999).
41. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996).
42. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325-27 (1934).
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jurisdiction. 3 The Court has also extended the doctrine to bar suits
brought under federal law against states in state courts.44
B. Congressional Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
Congress can only abrogate state sovereign immunity through
legislation enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 5 authorizes Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." '45 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides in relevant part: "No State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person.., the equal protection of the laws."
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,47 the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first
time that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Congress from using
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize private lawsuits
against states for money damages. 48 Through ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the states empowered Congress to enforce that
Amendment's substantive guarantees. 49 The Court saw no reason why
that enforcement could not include providing for private suits against
states, notwithstanding the constitutional doctrine of state sovereign
immunity."0 The Court limited the Fitzpatrick holding to the validity of
abrogating state sovereign immunity through the Section 5 power.5 The
Court did not discuss whether congressional power to abrogate was
confined exclusively to Section 5 legislation or whether other provisions
of the Constitution granted Congress the power to subject states to suit.
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,52 a plurality of the Court held that
Congress could use its Commerce Clause53 power to subject states to
suit.54
43. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890).
44. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,745 (1999).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
46. Id. § 1.
47. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
48. Id. at 456.
49. Id. at 454-56.
50. Id. at 456.
51. See id
52- 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 3.
54. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 23.
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Seven years later, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly overruled Union
Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.5 The Court held that Union Gas was
incorrectly decided and that no Article I power could be used to abrogate
sovereign immunity. 6 The effect of the Seminole Tribe holding is that
only legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment can be
used to subject states to suit.57 The Fourteenth Amendment altered the
pre-existing balance between state and federal power." States ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment well after the Eleventh Amendment with the
knowledge that they were ceding significant power to the federal
government 59 The Court reaffirmed the validity of Fitzpatrick, finding
that congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity is
available, but limited to legislation enacted pursuant to the Section 5
power.6
I. SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT POWER: FROM FLORES TO
KIMEL
The Seminole Tribe decision increased states' ability to use sovereign
immunity as a defense to suit.61 States cannot be sued under legislation
that Congress has not enacted through the Section 5 power.62 Recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions have limited what can be considered
appropriate Section 5 legislation, thereby further strengthening the
sovereign immunity defense.63
55. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
56. Id. at 72-73.
57. See id at 59.
58. Id. at 65-66.
59. See id.
60. See id at 59,66,72.
61. See William Thro, The Eleventh Amendment Revolution in the Lower Federal Courts, 25 J.C.
& U.L. 501,503 (1999).
62 See id
63. See id at 504.
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A. The Congruence and Proportionality Test: City of Boerne v. Flores
In City ofBoerne v. Flores,64 the Court faced its first opportunity since
the Seminole Tribe decision to discuss what constitutes valid Section 5
legislation. Flores involved a challenge to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA),65 a statute that prohibited the government from
burdening religious practices even if the burden resulted from neutral,
generally applicable laws.' The RFRA was enacted to supersede the
holding in Employment Division v. Smith,67 where the Court held that
religion-neutral laws that burden religious practices need not be
supported by a compelling government interest. 68 The purpose of the
RFRA was restoration of the compelling interest test to all cases where
the free exercise of religion is burdened.69
The Court in Flores explained that Congress exceeded its Section 5
power when enacting the RFRA.70 Section 5 gives Congress the power to
enact remedial legislation intended to remedy or prevent conduct that
would independently violate the Fourteenth Amendment.71 Congress has
wide latitude in determining what constitutes remedial legislation,' but
the U.S. Supreme Court will not uphold legislation that dilutes or
expands the protection that the Constitution offers citizens.73 Because of
the difficulty in determining where the line between appropriate remedial
and inappropriate substantive Section 5 legislation lies,74 Congress may
restrict some otherwise constitutional conduct if such restriction will help
prevent the unconstitutional conduct primarily targeted by the
legislation.75 If the legislation goes substantially beyond the substantive
64. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994).
66. Flores, 521 U.S. at515.
67. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
68. Id. at 885.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
70. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 532-36.
71. See id. at 519.
72. Id. at 520, 536.
73. See id. at 519-20, 536.
74. Id. at 519.
75. Id. at 518.
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protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must show, through
the legislative record, that it was justified in its legislative response.76
Rejecting the contention that the RFRA was appropriate remedial
legislation, the Court formulated a test for lower courts to apply in
determining whether legislation was appropriate under Section 5.' For
legislation to be "appropriate" under Section 5, "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."'78 In other words, the
substantive rights Congress gives to litigants through Section 5
legislation must be substantially similar to the rights litigants would have
if they brought suit under the Constitution. The means used by Congress
to prevent the harm must be proportional to the harm Congress seeks to
remedy.7
9
Using the congruence and proportionality test, courts must examine
whether Congress enacted the challenged legislation to remedy or
prevent state action that would likely be unconstitutional.80 The
legislation must enforce actual substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment or be a proportional response to previously documented
constitutional violations.8 ' If the legislation is found to mirror the
protection of the Constitution, the inquiry is at an end. However, if the
Court finds that the legislation goes beyond the substantive protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will look into the legislative
record for evidence suggesting that Congress had justification for
enacting such broad legislation.82
Applying the congruence and proportionality test to the RFRA's
compelling interest test, the Court found that the RFRA imposed the
"most demanding test known to constitutional law" on states to justify
facially neutral laws that burdened religious practices.8 3 By raising the
level of judicial scrutiny for neutral laws to the compelling interest
standard, the RFRA dramatically increased the protection normally given
to religious entities beyond what such entities would receive under the
76. See id. at 531-32.
77. See id. at 519-20.
78. Id. at 520.
79. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,88-89 (2000).
80. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
81. Thro, supra note 61, at 504.
82. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88.
83. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534.
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Constitution. The RFRA made otherwise constitutional state legislation
unlawful, and therefore the Act expanded the substance of the
Constitution." In addition, the Court found no evidence in the legislative
record that Congress had uncovered a widespread pattern of religious
discrimination that would justify remedial legislation of any sort, let
alone a broad statute like the RFRA."
The Court dismissed the argument that its previous decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan86 approved of a "one way ratchet" theory of
congressional authority. 7 Under such a theory, Congress could
permissibly expand but not dilute the substantive protection found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In Morgan, the Court upheld a challenged
provision of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)89 as appropriate Section 5
legislation. 90 Interpreting Morgan, the Flores Court explained that the
challenged VRA provision should be viewed either as a measure to
remedy unconstitutional discrimination in governmental services or to
remedy unconstitutional discrimination in establishing voter quali-
fications." Congress enacted the VRA to remedy state conduct that
would be independently unconstitutional.92 Unlike the RFRA, the VRA
did not give plaintiffs more substantive protection than found in the
Constitution.93 The RFRA could not be considered appropriate Section 5
legislation because it was not targeted at remedying unconstitutional
conduct; therefore, states were immune from suit under the RFRA. 4
84. See id. at 532-34.
85. Id. at 531.
86. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
87. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 527-28.
88. GEOFFREY STONE ETAL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261 (3d ed. 1996).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1994) (providing that no person with sixth-grade education
accredited by Puerto Rico could be prohibited from voting because of inability to read or write
English).
90. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646.
91. Flores, 521 U.S. at 528.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 532.
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B. Flores and Seminole Tribe Together: Restricting the Ability To Sue
States
The interplay between Flores and Seminole Tribe significantly
reduces the ability of plaintiffs to sue states under a variety of federal
statutes.9" If Congress did not enact a statute pursuant to Section 5 by
specifically enforcing substantive constitutional guarantees, then the
statute cannot abrogate sovereign immunity. 6 Because the RFRA
blatantly expanded the level of constitutional protection given to
religious entities, it was unclear how the U.S. Supreme Court would
apply the "congruence and proportionality" test when confronted with a
closer case.
The Court's opportunity to expand upon its explanation of the test
came in 1999. In that year, the Court decided three cases regarding
Section 5 legislation and sovereign immunity.97 In all three cases the
Court held for the States without substantial discussion of the
"congruence and proportionality" test.
The most extensive analysis of the congruence and proportionality test
occurred in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank.9 In Florida Prepaid, a patentee brought an action
against an agency of the State of Florida under provisions of the Patent
and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy
Act),'9 alleging patent infringement.'O The Court held that the Patent
Remedy Act was not appropriate Section 5 legislation."! Applying the
Flores test, the Court determined that the Patent Remedy Act was not
95. Joanne C. Brant, The Ascent ofSovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REv. 767, 769-72 (1998).
96. Thro, supra note 61, at 504.
97. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
98. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). In Alden, the Court found that the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938,29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), authorizing private actions against States, were based on
Congress's Article I power and could not abrogate sovereign immunity. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. In
College Savings Bank, the Court dismissed the contention that the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(1994)), validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. Coll Sa. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-75.
99. Codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 and 35 U.S.C. (1994). In Florida Prepaid, the
State of Florida challenged the validity of 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h) and 296(a) (1994). Those provisions
purported to abrogate state sovereign immunity for the purpose of patent infringement suits.
100. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 63 1.
101. Id. at 647.
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designed to prevent or remedy unconstitutional state action. °2 The Court
rejected the contention that the act was designed to enforce the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.0 3 The Fourteenth
Amendment offers no independent remedy to patent holders unless the
infringement occurred without due process of law."° Congress had
"barely considered" the remedies available to patent holders in state
courts, and the Court saw no evidence that Congress intended to prevent
due process violations.'05
Like the legislative findings in Flores, Congress had not identified a
pattern of patent infringement by the states to justify federal intervention,
nor was there evidence of any historical deprivation of constitutional
rights in this area of the law.'0 6 Due to the lack of evidence of
constitutional violations by the states in the patent infringement area, the
Patent Remedy Act could not be considered a proportional response
designed to prevent unconstitutional state action.0 7
C. The Court Held that the ADEA Was Inapplicable to the States
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,"0 8 the U.S. Supreme Court
applied the congruence and proportionality test to civil rights legislation
for the first time, holding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)'" inapplicable to state employers."0 U.S. Supreme Court
decisions prior to Kimel had held that states could constitutionally
discriminate on the basis of age if the discrimination was rationally
related to a state interest."' The Court found that the ADEA
impermissibly raised the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to age
discrimination claims." 2 Furthermore, the legislative record lacked
102. See id. at 639-41.
103. See id. at 641-43.
104. Id. at 643.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 645-46.
107. Id. at 646.
108. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
110. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
111. See Gregory v. Asheroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1976).
112. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-88.
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evidence of state-enforced age discrimination, and therefore Congress
was not justified in enacting such broad, substantive legislation.113
The plaintiffs in Kimel, employees of various state universities in
Florida, brought suit alleging that the Florida Board of Regents had not
fulfilled its promise to require universities to provide market adjustments
to the salaries of eligible employees.'14 The plaintiffs contended that this
failure to allocate funds had a disparate impact on the base pay of older
employees and therefore violated the ADEA." 5 The ADEA makes it
unlawful for employers, including state employers, "to fail or refuse to
hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual... because of such individual's age.""16 The Eleventh Circuit
held that the ADEA was not appropriate Section 5 legislation" 7 and the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split that had
emerged in the circuit courts."'
Applying the congruence and proportionality test, the Court examined
whether classifications based on age generally violate the Equal
Protection Clause." 9 The Court had previously decided three cases
regarding the constitutionality of age classifications. 2 ° In each of those
cases, the Court had held that the age classifications were
constitutional.' The legislatures had had a rational basis" for each of
the classifications at issue." In Kimel, the Court specifically
113. Id. at 89-91.
114. Id. at 69-70.
115. Id. at70.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
117. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71.
118. Id. The Eighth Circuit had previously held that the ADEA did not validly abrogate sovereign
immunity. Humenansky v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 827-28 (8th Cir. 1998). Six
other circuit courts had found the ADEA to be appropriate Section 5 legislation. See Cooper v. N.Y.
State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th
Cir. 1998); Coger v. Bd. of Regents, 154 F.3d 296 (6thCir. 1998); Keeton v. Univ. of Nev. System,
150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1998); Scott v. Univ. of Miss., 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v.
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of I11., 141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998).
119. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-84.
120. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass.
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
121. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
122. When a statute is evaluated under a "rational basis" standard, the court will accept almost
any justification even if it was not the one that motivated the legislature when writing the statute. See
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961).
123. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84-86.
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distinguished governmental age classifications from those based on race
or gender under which the government must show a substantial or
compelling interest to justify the classification. 24 Unlike race or gender,
states are allowed to discriminate on the basis of age if the classification
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 125
In Kimel, the Court found the ADEA to lack the necessary
"congruence and proportionality" required for appropriate Section 5
legislation.'26 The Court noted that a substantial number of state
employment classifications that would not violate the Constitution would
be unlawful under the ADEA.127 The Act also imposed a higher level of
judicial scrutiny on age classifications than required by equal protection
analysis. 2 ' The Equal Protection Clause allows broad, general
classifications based on age if a rational basis exists for the action.'29 To
the contrary, the ADEA required the employer to make individualized
determinations regarding whether a specific older employee was suitable
for employment. 30 The ADEA therefore imposed a substantially heavier
burden than rational basis review on state employers seeking to justify
classifications based on age.' 3' The ADEA subjected age classifications
to a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the Equal Protection Clause,
and therefore it impermissibly expanded the substance of constitutional
protection.
After finding that the ADEA expanded the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court looked for evidence in the legislative record that
would justify the enactment of such broad legislation. 132 The Court found
that Congress had uncovered inconsequential evidence of age
124. Id. at 83-84.
125. See id. at 84.
126. Id. at 82-83.
127. Id. at 85-86.
128. See id. at 86-88.
129. See id. at 87-88.
130. Id. at 87.
131. Id. at 87-88.
132- See id. at 88-91.
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discrimination by state employers.133 The limited findings made by
Congress only related to discrimination that would not have amounted to
equal protection violations, meaning that the age classifications were
rationally related to legitimate state interests.1 34 Although Congress
discovered age discrimination that was committed by private employers,
this evidence was wholly irrelevant to whether the states had engaged in
discrimination. 35 Thus, the Court determined that the evidence before
Congress did not justify the broad legislative response as applied to the
states.1 36 The ADEA could not be justified as a proportional response to
discrimination by the states against older Americans and was
inappropriate Section 5 legislation. 7
D. Lower Court Challenges to the Equal Pay Act
The EPA has not been immune from challenges to its validity as
Section 5 legislation. Prior to Kimel, the only two circuit courts of appeal
to consider whether the EPA was appropriate Section 5 legislation under
the congruence and proportionality test upheld it as such.13' The U.S.
Supreme Court vacated and remanded both decisions for reconsideration
in light of Kimel. 139
Pre-Kimel challenges to the validity of the EPA as Section 5
legislation primarily focused on the fact that an EPA plaintiff need not
prove discriminatory intent." For example, one district court held that
133. Id.
134. See id. at 89-91.
135. Seeid at 90-91.
136. Id. at 91.
137. See id at 91-92.
138. See Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117 (2dCir. 1999), vacatedandremanded by
528 U.S. 1111 (2000); Varner v. IlL. State Univ., 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated and
remanded by 528 U.S. 1110 (2000); see also Timmer v. Mich. Dep't of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833,
842 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding EPA as appropriate Section 5 legislation prior to Flores).
139. See State Univ. of N.Y. v. Anderson, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000); IU. State Univ. v. Vaner,.
140. See Varner, 150 F.3d at 714-15; see also Larry v. Bd. of Trustees, 975 F. Supp. 1447,1449-
50 (N.D. Ala. 1997) rev'd in part, vacated in part, 211 F.3d 598 (1lth Cir. 2000). Larry was
reversed and vacated by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals two weeks after its decision in
Hundertmark v. Florida Department of Transportation, 205 F.3d 1272 (1 th Cir. 2000). See Larry,
211 F.3d 598.
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the EPA was invalid Section 5 legislation on the sole basis that the EPA
does not require the plaintiff to prove the discriminatory effects were the
result of a state decision-maker's discriminatory intent.141 That court
found the EPA lacked the intent element required in equal protection
claims, so it could not be viewed as a statute enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause. 142 Other decisions dismissed this line of attack stating
that the EPA was enacted to prevent unconstitutional discrimination and
that Congress can forbid conduct otherwise permissible to prevent or
remedy unconstitutional conduct.
43
Three circuit courts of appeal have rendered decisions in suits
challenging the EPA since the Kimel decision.'" In each case, the court
has held that the EPA is appropriate Section 5 legislation even in light of
Kimel, although each court's reasoning and depth of analysis has varied.
In Varner v. Illinois State University, 45 the Seventh Circuit disagreed
with the defendant's contention that removing the burden of proving
intent from an EPA plaintiff renders the EPA incongruent with the Equal
Protection Clause.' 46 The court noted that compared to the ADEA, the
EPA was narrow in scope, 47 allowed employers a greater opportunity to
escape liability, 48 and targeted unconstitutional state action. 149 The court
found that in light of the prevalent problem of unconstitutional gender
discrimination, the enacted remedial scheme was sufficiently congruent
and proportional to the Fourteenth Amendment to be considered
appropriate Section 5 legislation. 50
With only brief analysis, the Eleventh Circuit in Hundertmark v.
Florida Department of Transportation5' held that the EPA is congruent
141. See Larry, 975 F. Supp. at 1449-50.
142. See id.
143. See Varner, 150 F.3d at 715-17; see also Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117 (2d
Cir. 1999), vacated, 528 U.S. I 111 (2000).
144. Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000); Hundertmark, 205 F.3d 1272;
Varner v. Ill. State. Univ., 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000).
145. 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000). In its first disposition of Varner, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals had held that the EPA was appropriate Section 5 legislation. See Varner, 150 F.3d 706. The
U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decision for reconsideration in light of Kimel. See
Varner, 528 U.S. 1110, 1110 (2000).
146. See Varner, 226 F.3d at 933-34.
147. See id. at 933.
148. See id. at 934.
149. See id. at 934-35.
150. See id. at 935-36.
151. 205 F.3d 1272 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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with the Equal Protection Clause solely because the aim of the EPA is to
eradicate intentional gender discrimination.'52 Most of the court's per
curiam opinion was dedicated to describing how gender discrimination is
a "problem of national import" and how, unlike age discrimination,
gender discrimination is generally unconstitutional.' The opinion did
not discuss the different burdens of proof in EPA and Equal Protection
Clause litigation, nor did it question whether Congress made sufficient
findings of gender discrimination in the public sector before extending
the EPA to the states."M
The Sixth Circuit in Kovacevich v. Kent State University,15 5 also with
limited discussion, upheld the EPA as appropriate Section 5
legislation.5 6 Relying heavily on dicta from Kimel157 the court
concluded that unlike the ADEA, the EPA does not prohibit substantially
more state employment decisions than would likely be held
unconstitutional. 158 The court emphasized that in the Sixth Circuit EPA
liability is equated with intentional gender discrimination and also noted
that the affirmative defenses available to employers reduce the
possibility that constitutional conduct is held unlawful under the EPA.
5 9
IV. GENDER DISCRIMINATION AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
When analyzing whether the EPA is appropriate Section 5 legislation,
a court must determine whether the EPA renders otherwise constitutional
conduct unlawful or if it simply remedies unconstitutional state action.
Therefore, courts must examine whether the conduct the EPA
conceivably targets, would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
specifically the Equal Protection Clause. Because the EPA is targeted at
ending differential rates of pay based solely on an employee's gender, 6 °
152. See id. at 1276-77.
153. See id.
154. See Id
155. 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000).
156. Id. at 821.
157. See id at 819 (placing special emphasis on language in Kimel contrasting age classifications
with those based on gender).
158. See id at 819-20.
159. See id at 820.
160. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
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the appropriate initial inquiry is to what extent gender-based wage
discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment.'16
The Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude state governments from
classifying groups of people. 62 When determining the constitutionality
of a legislative classification a court will normally ask whether the
classification is directed at the achievement of a legitimate governmental
purpose and whether it rationally furthers that purpose. 163 Courts
examining the constitutionality of legislation under this "rational basis"
standard are extremely deferential to the judgment of legislatures."6 If
any conceivable set of facts could explain the basis for the legislation
under the rational basis standard, a court will uphold the legislation as
proper under the Fourteenth Amendment.16
If legislatures classify individuals primarily on the basis of immutable
characteristics such as race 166 and gender,167 judicial scrutiny is height-
ened and the state bears a much heavier burden to justify the class-
ification.168 If a state facially discriminates on the basis of gender, it has
the burden of providing an "'exceedingly persuasive"' justification for
the discriminatory classification.'69 The state can meet this high standard
only if the discriminatory classification "'serves 'important govern-
mental objectives and... [is] substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.""'70 Any classifications used to "create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women" are invalid.'' If a
161. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (making initial inquiry into
whether and under what circumstances age discrimination violates Fourteenth Amendment).
162. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979).
163. See Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
164. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961).
165. See id.
166. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Racial classifications are subject
to "strict scrutiny," meaning they can only be upheld if they are justified by a compelling state
interest and are narrowly tailored to further that interest. See Bush v. Vea, 517 U.S. 952, 976
(1996).
167. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
168. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,272-73 (1979).
169. Virginia, 515 U.S. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).
170. Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler
v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
171. Id. at 534.
Vol. 76:279, 2001
Section 5 and the Equal Pay Act
state uses gender to classify individuals for purposes of distributing
benefits or burdens, such action will rarely be upheld."
Gender-neutral classifications that have discriminatory effects on
women also violate the Equal Protection Clause, but only if enacted with
a discriminatory purpose." Unlike facially gender-specific classifi-
cations, courts will not presume discriminatory intent behind such
classifications, and the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff to prove
the state action was enacted with discriminatory intent. 74 Proof of the
discriminatory effect alone will not be enough to make a prima facie
showing of intent. 5 If a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that
gender was a motivating factor in the decision-making process, the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish that the same decision at issue
would have been made even if gender had not been considered.7 6
The "heightened scrutiny" test applied to gender-specific
classifications also applies to neutral classifications where the plaintiff
proves discriminatory intent.'7 However, if gender discrimination is
proven to be a motivating factor behind state action that has a
discriminatory effect on women, the state cannot justify it under the
heightened scrutiny test described above. For example, a facially neutral
pay scale administered by state officials in a discriminatory fashion
would violate the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiff proved that
gender and not a legitimate non-discriminatory factor was the basis
behind the discriminatory treatment.'
V. COURTS SHOULD UPHOLD THE EPA AS APPROPRIATE
SECTION 5 LEGISLATION
The EPA is congruent and proportional with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore qualifies as
appropriate Section 5 legislation. Unlike recent congressional acts struck
down as inappropriate Section 5 legislation, the EPA does not grant
172 See id at 533.
173. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273-74.
174. See Id. at 276.
175. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,241-42 (1976).
176. See Village ofArlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 n.21 (1977).
177. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
178. See Id at 276 (stating that dispositive question for determining whether Equal Protection
Clause was violated was whether facially neutral statute was enacted with discriminatory purpose).
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plaintiffs more substantive rights than the Constitution. The EPA also
does not raise the level of scrutiny given to gender-based classifications,
and the EPA is congruent with the Equal Protection Clause even though
a plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent to prevail. Overall, due to
the narrow scope of the EPA, it is a proportional measure to combat
gender-based wage discrimination. In addition, Congress made the EPA
applicable to the states in response to substantial evidence that gender-
based wage discrimination was a serious problem in public
employment. 179 Thus, the EPA was enacted for a remedial purpose and is
valid Section 5 legislation.
A. The EPA Satisfies the Congruence and Proportionality Test
Under the congruence and proportionality test, a court must determine
whether the EPA targets the prevention of unconstitutional conduct or if
it impermissibly attempts to redefine the substance of constitutional
protection.'8" The EPA is congruent and proportional to the Equal
Protection Clause and is appropriate Section 5 legislation for three
reasons. First, the EPA does not subject gender-based classifications to a
higher level of judicial scrutiny than the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, although an EPA plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent
to prevail, the affirmative defenses available under the EPA make it
unlikely in practice that employers who lack the discriminatory intent
necessary for an equal protection violation will be held liable under the
EPA. Third, the EPA is very narrow in scope and is limited to preventing
unequal compensation of men and women who do equal work.
1. The EPA Does Not Mandate Closer Scrutiny of Gender-Based
Classi fications than the Equal Protection Clause
The EPA does not impose a higher level of judicial scrutiny on
gender-based classifications than would be given to such claims if
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. 8' Under the Equal
179. See infra Part V.B.
180. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000).
181. See Vamer v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (asserting that in some ways
Equal Protection Clause standard of liability is even more demanding than EPA); see also
Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 820 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The standard for liability under
the EPA closely approximates the equal protection analysis for state-sponsored gender
discrimination."). In Hundertmark v. Florida Department of Transportation, 205 F.3d 1272 (11 th
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Protection Clause, courts analyze gender classifications with a
heightened level of scrutiny.1 12 Because of the heightened scrutiny given
to gender-based classifications, it is unlikely that courts would find any
gender-based wage structure unlawful under the EPA that would not also
be independently unconstitutional.
A state wage structure expressly stating that females will be paid less
than males for doing the same work would clearly violate the EPA."8 3
Proof of a facially discriminatory policy that required paying men and
women unequally for equal work would easily satisfy the EPA's prima
facie requirements. 8a The government employer would then have the
burden of proving that the differential pay was based on a factor other
than gender. 5 The employer could not successfully invoke this defense
because by definition a gender-specific classification is based on
gender. 186
Assuming an analogous factual situation litigated under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the only way the state would not violate the Equal
Protection Clause is if it had an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
the policy.8 7 A state is unlikely to proffer any justification for a pay
classification requiring unequal pay for men and women who did equal
work persuasive enough for the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold the pay
classification as constitutional. The Equal Protection Clause offers
women extensive protection from gender-based classifications enacted
by states and states carry a heavy burden to justify them.
Cir. 2000), the court concluded that the EPA was congruent with the U.S. Supreme Court's standard
for reviewing cases under the Equal Protection Clause although the court provided nominal
justification for its position. See id. at 1277.
182. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996).
183. See L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978) (describing
employment policy requiring women to contribute more to pension fund than men on sole basis that
they are women); see also Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor, 92d Cong. 433 (1971) (describing public school salary schedule in
Salina, Kansas, that expressly paid male teachers more than female teachers).
184. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
185. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
186. Judicial interpretations of the EPA suggest that gender "can provide no part of the basis for
the wage differential." ZIMME ET AL., supra note 2, at 1007.
187. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. "Exceedingly persuasive justification" means the state must
prove that the discriminatory classification "serves 'important governmental objectives and... [is]
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."" Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,150
(1980))).
299
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Alternatively, a state could argue that even though gender
classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny, the EPA still holds
employers to a higher standard than the Fourteenth Amendment."'8 Under
the EPA, wage structures that pay women unequally based on gender are
illegal regardless of whether an important governmental purpose is
served.8 9 Under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications based on
gender are presumptively unconstitutional, but the presumption is
rebuttable. For example, to justify the classification under the
"exceedingly persuasive justification" test, 190 the state has the oppor-
tunity to show that the classification serves 'important governmental
objectives' and is "'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. "191
Such an argument underestimates the burden on an employer to justify
a gender-based classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Courts
reserve the most stringent level of judicial scrutiny for state
classifications that discriminate on the basis of race. However, as a
practical matter, the judicial scrutiny given to gender classifications is
much more similar to the "strict scrutiny"'192 given to racial classifications
than to the extremely deferential "rational basis"'93 standard used to
evaluate all other legislative decisions.' 94 In fact, in his dissent in United
States v. Virginia,195 Justice Scalia described the majority opinion as an
188. But see Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) ('The Constitution
demands an exceedingly persuasive justification for gender discrimination, while the [EPA] only
requires an employer to offer some legitimate reason for a wage disparity other than sex.").
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994) (stating that wage differential must be based on "any other
factor other than sex").
190. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
191. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724
(1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
192. Under "strict scrutiny" review, the government must have a compelling state interest to
justify the racial classification and there must be no less restrictive means to accomplish the
objective. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 976 (1996). Facially race-based classifications will
almost always fail "strict scrutiny" and therefore be held unconstitutional. See STONE Er AL., supra
note 88, at 601. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,217-19 (1944) (holding national-
security concerns enough to justify race-based classification).
193. See supra note 122.
194. Gender classifications are highly scrutinized because they are likely to reflect "archaic and
overbroad" generalizations about women. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1975).
However, gender classifications are not scrutinized as highly as race because, unlike with race, there
are cases where a legitimate justification for the disparate treatment of men and women exists. See
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981).
195. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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application of "strict scrutiny" to gender classifications. 196 A number of
commentators have also noted that, in practice, there is little difference
between the level of scrutiny given to gender and race classifications
after Virginia. 97 This similarity is significant because classifications
based on race are considered almost impossible to justify.98
States engaging in unequal gender-based pay are unlikely to have any
explanation that would satisfy the exceedingly persuasive justification
test. A state would have a difficult, if not impossible task explaining why
underpaying a woman who did equal work as a man served an important
governmental objective. A court would certainly classify any offered
justification as rooted in the stereotypical and overbroad generalizations
that are impermissible under the Equal Protection analysis of gender-
based classifications. 99
Finally, the EPA does not suffer from the primary problem the Court
found with the ADEA in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 2 ° which
was that the ADEA effectively raised the level of judicial scrutiny given
to age classifications.20' The ADEA imposed a level of scrutiny far more
rigorous than the "rational basis" review normally given to presump-
tively constitutional age classifications. 22 States may constitutionally
restrict employment opportunity for individuals above a certain age so
long as a rational basis exists for the action.23 The ADEA required
courts to apply a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the Constitution
would, making such otherwise constitutional age classifications pre-
sumptively illegal.2"
In summary, the EPA does not raise the level of constitutional scrutiny
given to gender classifications as the ADEA did with age classifications.
Unlike age classifications, the level of scrutiny given to gender
196. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 574-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197. See Barbara A. Lee, Discrimination Against Students in Higher Education: A Review of the
1996 Judicial Decisions, 24 J.C. & U.L. 619, 622 (1998); Carrie Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex
Education After VMI: Equal Protection and East Harlem's Young Women 's Leadership School, 145
U. PA. L. REV. 987, 1010 (1997).
198. No facially race-specific statute that disadvantaged a racial minority has been upheld since
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See STONE Er AL., supra note 88, at 601.
199. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34.
200. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
201. See Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d 927,934-35 (7th Cir. 2000).
202 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
203. See Gregory v. Ashcrof, 501 U.S. 452,470 (1991).
204. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
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classifications under the Equal Protection Clause is so high that such
classifications would rarely be constitutional.05 The EPA does not
impose a higher level of judicial scrutiny on gender-based classifications
than would be given to such claims if challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause.
2. The EPA Is Congruent with the Equal Protection Clause Even
Though an EPA PlaintiffNeed Not Prove Discriminatory Intent To
Prevail
A plaintiff does not have the burden of proving discriminatory intent
to prevail under the EPA. That fact notwithstanding, the EPA is
congruent with the Equal Protection Clause because the affirmative
defenses available to employers make it unlikely that employers will be
held liable under the EPA unless they had a discriminatory motive
behind their pay structure. While the EPA requires no prima facie
showing of intent, placing the burden of proof on the employer in EPA
litigation does not make it inappropriate Section 5 legislation. 2' The
shifting of the burden of proof does not change the fact that employers
who have legitimate non-discriminatory justifications for their wage
structures will escape liability under the EPA.
When plaintiffs challenge a facially neutral pay structure that has the
effect of discriminating against women2°7 under the Equal Protection
Clause, the important issue is not the level of judicial scrutiny given to
the pay structure, but whether the plaintiff can prove that it was enacted
with discriminatory intent.0 8 In contrast, a plaintiff does not have to
205. See id
206. The burden-shifting issue was not addressed in Hundertmark v. Florida Department of
Transportation, 205 F.3d 1272 (1I1th Cir. 2000). In Kovacevich v. Kent State University, 224 F.3d
806 (6th Cir. 2000), the court did not specifically discuss whether the burden-shifting effect of the
EPA affects its congruence to the Equal Protection Clause. In Varner v. Illinois State University, 226
F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2000), the state's primary argument was based on the burden-shifting effect of the
EPA. See id. at 934. The court agreed that the requirements of the EPA did not mirror the Equal
Protection Clause and that some constitutional conduct was prohibited under the EPA. Id. The court
noted, however, that the EPA's affirmative defenses provide sufficient opportunity for an innocent
employer to escape liability. Id.
207. See, e.g., EEOC v. Del. Dep't of Health & Social Services, 865 F.2d 1408, 1414-16 (3d Cir.
1989) (showing that female nurses were paid less than male physician's assistants even though their
jobs entailed equal work satisfies prima facie case under EPA).
208. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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prove discriminatory intent to prevail under the EPA.2' In an EPA claim,
the defendant has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the pay
structure was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory factors.
Notwithstanding the differences in the plaintiff's prima facie case and
in the defendant's burden of proof in EPA and equal protection claims,
the EPA is appropriate Section 5 legislation. Although the plaintiff in an
EPA claim does not have to prove discriminatory intent to prevail, the
structure of EPA litigation ensures that employers will only be held
liable when the court finds an impermissible motive of gender
discrimination behind the pay structure.2 0 The EPA requires the
employer to show that the wage differential was in fact the result of non-
discriminatory intentions." By allowing the employer to escape liability
with a showing that any "factor other than sex" motivated the wage
structure,2"2 all possible motives for the wage differential other than
gender will be eliminated and a court will be left with essentially a
finding of gender-based discrimination.213 By definition, when a court
finds an employer's conduct to be based on gender and not motivated by
non-discriminatory reasons, the court has found that the employer
intended to discriminate.214
The EPA is conducive to uncovering the same discriminatory intent
necessary for Equal Protection violations. While the EPA does not
expressly require evidence of intent, what separates many successful
EPA defendants from unsuccessful ones is whether or not the court has
reason to suspect intent to discriminate.215 Therefore, the lack of a prima
facie intent requirement should not be enough to make the EPA
inappropriate Section 5 legislation.
209. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
210. See Varner, 226 F.3d at 934.
211. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974).
212. Facially pretextual justifications offered by employers will not satisfy the fourth affirmative
defense. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982); supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
213. See Varner, 226 F.3d at 934.
214. In Karte v. Diemer, 909 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990), the court held that a finding of liability
under the EPA could be used in a later Title VII suit as evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. at
959. It noted that conduct found to violate the EPA could not be said in a later suit to lack intent to
discriminate based on gender. Id.; see also Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 820 (6th
Cir. 2000) (equating EPA liability with Title VII liability for intentional gender discrimination).
215. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1008; see also Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-
Time Work- The Case for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C. L. REV. 709, 747-49 (1986)
(describing cases that suggest intent to discriminate is touchstone of liability under EPA).
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The EPA's structure prevents employers from being held liable for
constitutionally permissible behavior despite the placement of the risk of
non-persuasion on the employer. To ensure that the EPA would not
interfere with legitimate pay structures, Congress gave employers four
affirmative defenses to avoid liability if the wage discrimination was not
based on gender.216 The fourth affirmative defense states that if the wage
differential was based on "any other factor other than sex" the employer
will escape liability.217
While courts have not interpreted the EPA's fourth affirmative
defense to literally mean that any factor, no matter how obviously
pretextual, will justify the wage differential, courts are deferential to an
employer's stated purpose.218 Courts "are not permitted to 'substitute
their judgment for the judgment of the employer.., who [has]
established and applied a bona fide job rating system, so long as it does
not discriminate on the basis of sex."219 The broad interpretation given to
this affirmative defense makes it unlikely that a substantial number of
employers would be held liable under the EPA for conduct that would
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.220
The fact that the state bears the risk of non-persuasion221 in EPA
litigation does not compel the result that the EPA is incongruent with the
Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has granted Congress
wide latitude in determining where the line between remedial and
substantive legislation lies.222 If Congress enacts legislation to prevent or
remedy unconstitutional conduct, it may simultaneously prohibit a
"somewhat broader swath of conduct" including conduct not otherwise
unconstitutional.223 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has a very narrow view
216. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
217. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
218. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1982).
219. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981).
220. See Nina Joan Kimbell, Not Just Any 'Factor Other Than Sex': An Analysis of the Fourth
Affirmative Defense of the Equal Pay Act, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318,320-21 (1984) (arguing that
broad interpretations of EPA have limited its remedial effectiveness).
221. The party who bears the burden of proof on an issue bears the risk that the trier of fact will
not be persuaded. See 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 410 (5th ed. 1999).
222. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
223. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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of what constitutes appropriate Section 5 legislation, 4 has suggested that
placing the burden of proof on the government is permissible in the
Section 5 context when legislation is otherwise focused on preventing
unconstitutional conduct.'
The significance of placing the risk of non-persuasion on the state is
limited to cases where the trier of fact remains uncertain who should
prevail after all the evidence is presented. 6 The law needs one party to
bear the risk of non-persuasion only because a decision must be made;
litigation cannot end in a tie.n7 Who bears the risk is often a somewhat
arbitrary judicial or legislative determination guided by principles of
fairness and public policy. 8 Congress presumably felt that it would be
more fair for the employer shown to have a policy of paying men and
women unequally for equal work to bear the risk of non-persuasion.
Considering that the purpose of the EPA is to eradicate gender-based
wage discrimination,' as well as the difficulties inherent in proving
subjective discriminatory intent,' ° and the broad defenses available to
employers," Congress justifiably placed the risk of non-persuasion on
the employer instead of the employee.
Congress narrowly defined the substantive elements of the EPA so
that only employers who pay discriminatory wages on the basis of
gender are held liable.3 2 Because the structure of EPA litigation often
brings discriminatory motives to the forefront, the lack of a prima facie
intent requirement should not be enough to make the EPA incongruent
with the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the congressional
decision to shift the risk of non-persuasion to the employer is within the
permissible bounds of the Section 5 power.
224. Chief Justice Rehnquist has authored many of the recent decisions limiting Congress's
ability to legislate under Section 5. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
225. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 214 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("Congress could properly conclude that... it was necessary to place the burden of proving lack of
discriminatory purpose on the [government].").
226. See STRONG ETAL., supra note 221, at 410.
227. See idJ
228. See Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 5, 11-12 (1959).
229. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
230. See David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the
ConstitutionalRacialDiscrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285,298 (1998).
231. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
232. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
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3. The EPA Is a Proportional Measure To Combat Gender-Based
Wage Discrimination
Congress narrowly limited the scope of the EPA to prevent only
unconstitutional gender-based wage discrimination. 233 Legislation that is
broadly over-inclusive is less likely to be a proportional response to the
specific unconstitutional conduct at issue.3 The EPA is very narrow in
scope and is a proportional measure to combat gender-based wage
discrimination.
The EPA is focused on only one area of state responsibility: the
relationship between state employer and employee. The EPA only
regulates the compensation aspect of public employment. It does not deal
with hiring, promotions, firing, or other wage discrimination issues
relating to unequal or comparable work.235 It addresses only the rate of
compensation between two employees who do equal work. 6 This
extremely narrow scope supports a finding that the EPA is a proportional
response to gender-based wage discrimination.237
Unlike the EPA, previous statutes challenged as inappropriate
Section 5 legislation have broadly intruded into traditional areas of state
responsibility.238 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 39 was
a broad intrusion into the state legislative process.2' The RFRA affected
potentially every piece of legislation that a state enacted. If state
legislation would possibly burden a religious entity, the statute would
have to satisfy the stringent "compelling interest" test required by the
RFRA.241 Similarly, the ADEA242 intruded on all areas of state
233. Thro, supra note 61, at 505.
234. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1961), with Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), and City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
235. Title VII protects employees from discrimination in these other aspects of the employment
relationship. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e(17) (1994).
236. ZIMMER E" AL., supra note 2, at 988.
237. Post-Kimel circuit court opinions have not emphasized the narrow scope of the EPA. It is
clear, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court often focuses its attention on the scope of a challenged
provision. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 85-86; Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4.
240. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534.
241. Id. at 533-34.
242. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
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employment243 by imposing requirements on every aspect of the
relationship between state employer and employee.244
The EPA does not reach more broadly than is necessary to combat
gender-based wage discrimination. The EPA only regulates the wages of
individuals who do equal work but are paid unequally. It does not
regulate other aspects of the employment relationship, or other state
functions. Due to the EPA's narrow reach and scope, courts should
consider the statute a proportional measure to combat unconstitutional
discrimination.
B. Congress was Justified in Applying the EPA to States Due to
Substantial Evidence of Gender-Based Wage Discrimination by
State Employers
Because it gathered substantial evidence that state employers engaged
in gender-based wage discrimination, Congress was justified in applying
the EPA to the states.24 Testimony heard throughout the early 1970s
gave Congress substantial evidence that gender-based wage
discrimination was a serious problem in public employment.2' This
evidence strengthens the argument that Congress was justified in
applying the protection of the EPA to state employees.
In its recent re-evaluation of sovereign immunity in Flores, Florida
Prepaid, and Kimel, the Court has looked into the legislative record for
evidence that the legislative response at issue was necessary to prevent
constitutional violations by the states.47 "The appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.
Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
243. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 85-87.
244. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
245. Of the post-Kimel opinions, only Varner v. Illinois State University, 226 F.3d 927 (7th Cir.
2000), adequately addressed the legislative findings issue. Id. at 935 (citing Congress's clear
understanding of state-enforced gender discrimination). In Hundertmark v. Florida Department of
Transportation, 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2000), the court stated that the lack of findings with
respect to wage discrimination in the public sector was not dispositive because "gender
discrimination is a problem of national import." Id. at 1276. This directly contradicts language in
Kimel stating that evidence of discrimination in the private sector is irrelevant when determining
whether legislation is appropriate under Section 5. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90. The court in
Kovacevich v. Kent State University, 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000) did not address the legislative
findings of Congress.
246. Infira note 262.
247. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-91; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 639-40; Flores, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
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response to another, lesser one. ' 8 Courts must look to the legislative
record for evidence showing whether Congress was justified in enacting
the purportedly remedial statute.249
Prior to Kimel, lower courts upheld the EPA as appropriate Section 5
legislation based on the extensive evidence placed before Congress that
private employers engaged in a long history of gender-based wage
discrimination."' This type of evidence, however, is irrelevant to
whether Congress was justified in applying the EPA to the states. 5 ' In
Kimel, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly noted that a congressional
finding of "substantial age discrimination in the private sector... is
beside the point."25 2 The inquiry into the legislative record should be
limited only to evidence placed before Congress that the states
themselves were engaged in unconstitutional discrimination. 53
This inquiry need not be limited only to the hearings relating
specifically to the EPA. When considering whether the EPA is
appropriate Section 5 legislation, the Court may look to all the evidence
placed before Congress to see if it could have rationally concluded that
there was a problem. 4 Courts cannot ignore the substantial evidence that
Congress had gathered in hearings relating to the other legislation
enacted in the early 1970s that dealt with gender-discrimination in public
employment. Because members of Congress may use information
learned from one set of hearings or debates as a basis for enacting other
legislation,55 it is appropriate to consider the full range of evidence
Congress heard regarding the extensive nature of sex discrimination by
the states.
Before enacting the Fair Labor Standards Amendments, Congress
heard extensive testimony regarding the need for the Fair Labor
248. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530 (citations omitted).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Vamer v. 111. State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 716-17 (7th Cir. 1998).
251. Kinel, 528 U.S. at 90. Lack of legislative findings is not determinative of the Section 5
inquiry. Id. at 91.
252. Id. at 90.
253. See id.
254. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("One
appropriate source [of evidence for Congress] is the information and expertise that Congress
acquires in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation.").
255. Id.
256. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
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Standards Act, 6 of which the EPA is an amendment, to be applied to the
states.' The majority of the evidence Congress heard related to the need
for extending the reach of the minimum-wage and child-labor
provisions. 8 However, Congress also called numerous witnesses to
testify to the pervasive nature of gender-based wage discrimination in
public schools and state universities, and therefore the need for making
the EPA applicable to public employers. 9 This evidence showed that,
especially in the university and public school settings, women were paid
less than men even though they performed equal work and that this wage
disparity was attributable to intentional gender discrimination.2" The
evidence showed that the problem was present in universities throughout
the nation.26'
In addition to the hearings relating specifically to the Fair Labor
Standards Amendments, the early 1970s were a time when Congress
heard much testimony regarding discrimination against women by the
states.262 Before extending the EPA to the states, Congress enacted Title
257. See generally Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 14 (1973).
258. Id.
259. FairLabor Standards Amendments of1971: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 92d Cong. 292-93 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 FLSA]
(testimony of.Judith Lonnquist, Legal Counsel, Chicago Chapter, National Organization of Women);
id at 317 (testimony of Dr. Ann Scott, National Organization of Women); id. at 321 (testimony of
Dr. Bernice Sandier, Member, Women's Equity Action League); id at 350 (Dr. Alan Bayer,
Research Scientist, Institute for Research in Education); id at 363 (Helen Bain, President, National
Education Association); see also To Amend the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before the
General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ & Labor, 91st Cong. 477-78 (1970)
[hereinafter 1970 FLSA] (testimony of Wilma Scott Heide, Chairman of the Board, National
Organization of Women).
260. 1971 FLSA, supra note 259, at 363 (testimony of Helen Bain) (testifying that female college
professors "almost without exception, receive... substantially less for the same work than do their
male counterparts" and that "[i]t is highly doubtful that these statistics are merely accidental").
261. 1971 FISA, supra note 259, at 322 (testimony of Dr. Bernice Sandier) (documenting studies
showing unequal pay for equal work at University of Minnesota, University of Arizona, and Kansas
State Teachers College); see also 1970 FLSA, supra note 259, at 547-50 (testimony of Dr. Bernice
Sandier) (documenting complaints of unequal pay for equal work by female employees at University
of Pittsburgh, University of California at Berkeley, and University of Michigan).
262. E.g., Discrimination Against Women: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Educ. ofthe
Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 91st Cong. 234-35 (1970) (statement of Congresswoman Catherine
May); il at 433-34 (statement of Congresswoman Patsy Mink); Equal Rights for Men and Women
1971: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 95 (1971)
(statement of Congressman William Ryan); Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the
Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong. 131-32 (1973) (statement of Aileen C. Hernandez, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission).
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IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,263 and extended Title VII to
state employers.2'6 Evidence gathered in the hearings relating to these
pieces of legislation also revealed pervasive gender discrimination by
public employers.2 65 The legislative hearings relating to the amendment
of Title VII included extensive testimony regarding the pernicious nature
of state-enforced employment discrimination.266 The evidence gathered at
these hearings relating to anti-discrimination measures enacted just prior
to the EPA indicates that Congress passed the EPA based on substantial
evidence of gender-based wage discrimination in public employment.
As opposed to Flores, where Congress had not documented modem
instances of religious discrimination by states that would justify the
RFRA,267 or in Kimel, where Congress had no evidence the states
engaged in unconstitutional age discrimination, 68 Congress had evidence
before it that the states did engage in gender-based wage
discrimination. 9 Not only did the hearings specifically relating to the
Fair Labor Standards Amendments reveal this, but so did the extensive
hearings relating to the other acts passed by Congress in the 1970s that
were aimed at preventing women from being discriminated against by
state employers.70 Considering all the evidence of state enforced gender-
based wage discrimination placed before Congress in the early 1970s,
Congress was justified in applying the EPA to the states.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike legislation recently held to be inappropriate Section 5
legislation, the EPA is congruent with the Fourteenth Amendment and is
a proportional response to gender-based wage discrimination engaged in
263. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318,86 Stat. 373,373 (codified as amended
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994)).
264. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).
265. Supra note 262.
266. E.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Procedures: Hearings Before the General
Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 92d Cong. 466 (1971) (testimony of Helen
Bain, President, National Education Association); id. at 489 (statement of Commission on the Status
of Women of the Modem Language Association of America).
267. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997).
268. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
269. Supra note 262.
270. Supra note 262.
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by the states. The Act does not raise the level of constitutional scrutiny
given to gender-specific classifications, nor does it broadly interfere with
state responsibility. The EPA prevents states from doing what they are
prohibited from doing under the Fourteenth Amendment: paying a
woman less than a man simply because of her gender. The EPA does not
require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent to make out a prima
facie case, but this does not automatically render the EPA inappropriate
Section 5 legislation. The statute is narrowly designed to ensure that
employers' legitimate pay structures are upheld and employers who
sexually discriminate are held liable. The EPA should be upheld as
appropriate Section 5 legislation. State employees should remain able to
vindicate their right to equal pay for equal work when state employers
fall to meet the standards found not only in the Equal Pay Act, but also in
the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
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